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Abstract
Distilling a theory of “qualia”—with at least some degree
of consensus—has been a grand point of contention in the
philosophy of mind since the term qualia were introduced.
In this paper, I will focus on one area where qualia realists
and anti-realists come to head-to-head; how does philosophy
sufficiently account for qualia’s constitutive property of
“intrinsic subjectivity”? First, I will summarize David
Chalmers’ meta-problem to contextualize this aspect of the
qualia debate. Second, I explain how Keith Frankish’s theory
of “illusionism” is a tenable solution to resolving the metaproblem from an anti-qualia realist perspective. Yet, when it
comes to addressing qualia’s constitutive feature of intrinsic
subjectivity, illusionism faces an insurmountable obstacle due
to its methodological commitment to third-person empiricism.
I argue the preceding point by analyzing how illusionism
confronts two challenges: (1) Philip Goff’s real-acquaintance
hypothesis, accompanied with Goff’s theory of panpsychism;
(2) a modern adaptation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “private
language” thought experiment. My purpose is to argue that
Frankish’s theory of illusionism is ill-equipped for dealing with
these philosophical challenges.
Introduction
The term “qualia” is referenced in a wide range of philosophical
arguments which maintain the elements of conscious experience
that cannot be reduced to neuroscientific explanation. The
classic definition of qualia refers to the intrinsic, subjective, and
ineffable components of conscious experience (Frankish 2012,
2-3). The subjective component is “what-it’s-like” to undergo
a conscious experience, emphasizing the subject’s direct access
to their own conscious experience. Qualia realists claim that
even if we provided the most sophisticated neuroscientific
explanation of our conscious experiences, this would fail to
encapsulate qualia (Nagel 1974, 435). Therefore, qualia are
irreducible as such.
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The philosopher Keith Frankish defends the potential for thirdperson empiricism, such as developments in neuroscience, to
“explain away” the ontological reality of qualia. In response
to the qualia realist’s convictions, Frankish claims they are
cast under a cognitive “illusion” that qualia properties exist.
For example, he argues that the claim qualia are accessed via
“introspection” will eventually be explained as a cognitive
illusion (Frankish 2016, 12-13). In this sense, Frankish respects
that qualia realists claim that it “feels like” there are qualia
properties, but he denies their ontological existence.
The aim of my paper is to show how Frankish’s proposed
method for explaining away qualia through neuroscience hits
a dead-end when attempting to dismantle qualia’s constitutive
property of intrinsic subjectivity. The crux of my argument
is that Frankish’s commitment to third-person empiricism
ultimately prevents him from directly addressing the definition
of intrinsic subjectivity. My paper will show how this problem
emerges in two different contexts. First, I will show how
Frankish’s theory of illusionism faces against Philip Goff’s
“real acquaintance hypothesis” and panpsychism, wherein the
property of intrinsic subjectivity plays a central role. Second,
to further drive the point that qualia’s property of intrinsic
subjectivity is irreconcilable for illusionism, I will be reimagining Wittgenstein’s famous “private language” thought
experiment from a modern perspective. Lastly, I will present
and respond to a potential counterclaim by Frankish, in which
he defends his treatment of qualia realism for being compatible
with David Chalmers’ meta-problem.
Qualia & the Meta-Problem
A discussion about qualia in the 21st-century seems to always
begin with reference to Chalmers’ seminal hard problem—how
philosophy can account for conscious experience if our scientific
understanding of the functional, dynamical, and structural
properties of the brain cannot? (Chalmers 1995, 200). Chalmers’
critics note that his phrasing of the hard problem is misleading
because he relies on the a priori stipulation that brain processes
and conscious experiences are ontologically distinct. As a
result, Chalmers problematically dismisses the sizable literature
arguing that our gaps in theories of consciousness will be
overcome through advancements in neuroscientific research
(Schier & Carruthers 2017). With respect to that hypothesis,
many anti-qualia realists prefer the qualia-neutral perspective
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Chalmers adopts in the phrasing of his meta-problem: “why
do we ‘feel’ that qualia exist?” Unlike the hard problem,
the meta-problem does not insinuate that qualia properties
must necessarily exist in order to address the discrepancy
between our scientific understanding of brain processes and
our conscious experiences. At the same time, Chalmers’ metaproblem maintains that qualia realist arguments—such as the
introspective claim that qualia exist—must be reckoned with in
any theory of consciousness. To the advantage of both qualia
realists/anti-realists alike, embarking on the meta-problem will
either: (a) shed light on how to navigate the hard problem, or
(b) illuminate an avenue for a neurophysiological explanation
that thoughtfully addresses qualia realist concerns (Chalmers
2018).
Qualia & Intrinsic Subjectivity
According to Chalmers, anti-qualia realism’s response to the
meta-problem requires a robust explanation for qualia realists’
long-held intuitions. My paper will zero in on Chalmers’
metaphysical intuition that consciousness is intrinsic to an
individual’s subjective experience (Chalmers 2018). According
to Chalmers, the metaphysical intuition is indebted to
René Descartes’ argument that I can doubt all the external
relationships in the physical world, but I cannot doubt the fact
that I am conscious. Therefore, the datum I can be most certain
of is the fact that I am conscious (Descartes 1641).
We can see Descartes’ legacy in contemporary theories
claiming that qualia are “intrinsically subjective.” To claim a
property is “intrinsic” means that its existence can be grasped
independently from all other extrinsic properties. Attributing
the feature of “intrinsic” to subjective qualia properties implies
that qualia must necessarily be grasped by the subject directly
via first-hand experience (Langton & Lewis 1998). Qualia
theories of this kind draw upon Bertrand Russell’s insight into
the limitations of the material sciences—which are restricted
to structural-functional explanations—for its inability to
explain intrinsic natures (Russell 1927) . Inspired by Russell’s
views, Chalmers states, “the problem [referring to the hard
problem] is hard precisely because it is not a problem about
the performance of functions (Chalmers 1995). The problem
persists even when the performance of all relevant functions
are explained.” Positing that “qualia are intrinsic” resolves
Chalmers’ hard problem that our structural-functional brain
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processes fail to account for subjective experience since
qualia serve the role as a “missing puzzle piece” that is nonstructural-functional. Simultaneously, the qualia-as-intrinsic
hypothesis addresses Russel’s concern that structural-functional
relationships as described in the material sciences cannot
account for intrinsic natures.
The qualia-as-intrinsic hypothesis may lead to two distinct
ontologies: a branch of Russellian monism claiming that qualia
are the only intrinsic properties of substances; a branch of
Cartesian dualism postulating that physical substances have
non-experiential intrinsic properties of which we may have no
knowledge, alongside experiential intrinsic properties of which
we can be certain of (i.e., one’s conscious experience) (Menon &
Siddarth 2017). The qualia realist perspectives discussed in this
paper opt for the first.
The Illusionist Position
Frankish’s theory of “illusionism” agrees with Chalmers’
claim that anti-qualia realists must provide a neuroscientific
explanation for why qualia theories are so pervasive. The
important difference is that illusionism insists that qualia
properties are not “real” in an ontological sense of the term
(Frankish 2016, 14). The illusionist approach is motivated
by the success of third-person empiricism in dissolving our
fallacious convictions about the natural world. When using
the term “third-person,” I am referring to neurophysiological
explanations that analyze qualia from a perspective that is
external to the subject of experience. Looking back at the history
of science, there is a strong case to be made for conducting
science from a third-person perspective. Most notably, the shift
from first-person empirical methodology, such as Aristotle’s
Ptolemaic worldview, is what allowed invaluable paradigm
shifts as Galileo’s Heliocentric worldview (Goff 2020).
In the following analogy, I will bolster Frankish’s conviction
that adopting a third-person perspective when investigating
qualia is advantageous. Now, imagine that you are looking
out towards the horizon of the desert. In the far distance, you
believe that you see a pool of water. Perhaps to your surprise,
a physicist comes along and explains to you how your eyes are
actually fooling you. They explain how when sunlight passes
through two layers of air with distinct temperatures, the two
air masses collide and appear like a mirror. Thus, the supposed
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“lake” is actually a reflection of the sky above. This fascinating
optical illusion is called “mirage” and is essentially analogous
to how illusionists hypothesize about qualia. Because we are so
radically misled by our immediate, perceptual representations
of the natural world, how are we to be certain about our firstperson intuitions about qualia-as-intrinsic? Frankish doubts the
epistemic reliability of qualia impressions, like how Descartes
considered that an “evil demon” could be deceiving his
impressions of the external world. Thus, Frankish proposes that
theories of consciousness should be informed by neuroscience,
such that our theories of consciousness are no longer “radically
at odds with that of the physical sciences” (Frankish 2016, 24).
The Panpsychist Challenge
My first criticism is that illusionism’s reliance on third-person
empiricism does not adequately address the qualia realist belief
that subjects of experience have inherent access to the nature
of qualia. To provide a concrete example of the impenetrability
of the qualia realist’s argument, I will be examining a qualia
theory posed by Philip Goff, a contemporary qualia realist.
According to Goff’s “real acquaintance hypothesis,” individuals
have direct, epistemic access to the intrinsic nature of qualia
in virtue of “being” in an experiential state (Goff 2015, 3).
For instance, Goff believes that one cannot be in the state of
pain and not have epistemic access to the essence of pain.
Therefore, the experience of pain is the essential property
of pain and constitutes the “real definition” of pain. In
Goff’s real acquaintance hypothesis, we see the influence of
Descartes’ argument that one can doubt the external referent
of experience—such as the neurophysiological basis of the
pain experience—but we cannot doubt that we are having a
conscious experience (Menon & Siddarth 2017, 411). In the same
way, Goff claims that simply being in an experiential state of
pain allows one to grasp the intrinsic nature of that state.
I will be considering ways that Frankish could possibly
respond to Goff’s “real acquaintance hypothesis” based on the
information he provides (Goff 2015, 3). First, Frankish might
be tempted to refute that only subjects with “introspective
mechanisms” possess the capacity to have perceptual illusions
of qualia (Frankish 2016, 14). In this sense, Frankish’s refutation
relies on cases where our perceptual faculties cause misleading
misrepresentations of the nature of the world (e.g., the
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mirage). The problem is that analyzing a human’s capacity for
introspection from a cognitive perspective does not reach the
heart of Goff’s claim about intrinsic subjectivity. Goff argues
that consciousness arises simply from “being,” allowing for a
direct acquaintance to the intrinsic nature of one’s subjective
experience through simply having that experience. Notably,
there is nothing contained in Goff’s view that necessitates
any particular process involving the brain whatsoever (e.g.,
the capacity for introspection, mental representations, goaldirected behavior, etc.). Rather, according to Goff’s formulation,
any “subject”—in a very broad sense of the term—has the
capacity for intrinsic subjectivity (Goff 2015, 10). Goff’s “real
acquaintance” hypothesis puts pressure on illusionism since
its prioritization of first-person empiricism is antithetical to
Frankish’s commitment to third-person empiricism.
Goff’s particular perspective on qualia can be broadly
categorized under the umbrella term “panpsychism.” In brief,
panpsychism encompasses a large sum of theories throughout
the history of philosophy. Pansychist views profess that
consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural
world. The most contentious element of panpsychism is the
claim that inanimate objects are conscious. Panpsychists will
go as far as claiming “thermostats are conscious,” an assertion
that challenges how we colloquially use the term “conscious” in
association with human cognition (Chalmers 1995). I will omit
a detailed history of panpsychism because it is irrelevant to
my following point about illusionism’s inability to adequately
address panpsychism’s principles according to the merit of its’
own methodology.
Although Frankish’s addressment of panpsychism is brief, I
argue that it shows an important way that illusionism fails
to sufficiently address the essential components of qualia
directly. Frankish simply claims that the neuroscientist’s
inability to vindicate their assertions—such as thermostats
having conscious experience—is justification for accusing
them of fabricating a “fiction” (Frankish 2016, 32). Here,
Frankish’s justification is problematic because it is antithetical
to his anti-first-person intuitional approach. Supposedly, the
key advantage of relying upon third-person neuroscientific
explanations is to overcome the fact that our introspectively
derived impressions about our conscious experiences are
systematically misleading. After all, Frankish’s argument relies
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heavily on the assertion that our attitudes towards theories of
consciousness cannot rest on superficial attitudes about what
theories of consciousness ought to be like. Instead, we ought
to be persuaded by the theory that is the most “rationally
compelling” (Frankish 2016, 37). With respect to that rationale,
it is hypocritical for the illusionist to fight the panpsychist
intuition by merely retorting their own intuition that antiqualia realism can rely on advancements in neuroscience.
The hypocrisy lies in the fact that, instead of relying on his
methodology to dismantle “intrinsic subjectivity” as a cognitive
illusion, Frankish seems to merely protest that intrinsic
subjectivity is not a conveniently discernable concept for the
purpose of neuroscientific research.
According to my analysis, the qualia realist who holds intrinsic
subjectivity would have the upper hand against Frankish in the
panpsychist debate. When the qualia realist claims “intrinsically
subjective,” they are not only making a case about the ontology
of qualia, but they are also simultaneously designating the
constraints on how philosophy can accommodate qualia in
a scientific worldview. From that perspective, de-bunking
qualia realism is not a matter of acquiring a more detailed
understanding of cognitive mechanisms, as Frankish would
hope (Frankish 2016, 37). Adhering to the definition of
“intrinsically subjective,” a qualia realist would say that
even if a neuroscientist were to provide the most complete,
neurophysiological explanation of our conscious experience,
they would be failing to grasp his point about that conscious
experience is necessarily grasped by the subject’s first-person
experience, and not by any other means (Goff 2017, 7). To that
extent, Frankish’s hands are tied, unless he is able to provide
a neuroscientific account about why panpsychists are being
systematically deceived about their beliefs that thermostats are
conscious.
I argue that even if Frankish attempted to directly address the
component of intrinsic subjectivity, his proposed explanation
would fail to be compelling compared to the panpsychist.
Recall, for illusionism to prevail against qualia realism, the
anti-qualia realist must explain why our conscious experiences
seem to have an additional quality that feels to be “intrinsically
subjective” but is actually an illusion. Frankish generally
addresses the challenge of explaining our perception of qualia
in neuroscientific terms as the “illusion problem.”
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When speaking of the illusion problem, Frankish provides a
general schema for how philosophy can interpret the qualia
realist’s claims about the nature of conscious experience. When
the qualia realist insists upon the ontological distinctiveness of
consciousness, Frankish insists they are deceived by systematic
illusions caused by their perceptual faculties. He uses the term
“quasi-phenomenal property” as a place-holder term for the
cognitive process underpinning the qualia realist’s beliefs about
qualia (Frankish 2016, 16). For example, when qualia realists
claim that their visual experience of red has the property of
“phenomenal redness,” the illusionist says that physical quasiphenomenal properties “trigger” introspective representations
of phenomenal redness. In other words, the qualia realist’s
perception of phenomenal redness is an illusory perception that
subsists on top of their perceptual visual experience of red.
What is significant is that Frankish’s construal does not consist
of showing how quasi-phenomenal properties are real. Rather,
Frankish merely posits that when the qualia realist claims that
they have “direct access” to the nature of qualia, they have
no way of knowing that what they are referring to is a quasiphenomenal property. Essentially, Frankish’s accusation can be
summarized in the following question: how would the qualia
realist know the difference between a phenomenal property
(i.e., qualia) or a quasi-phenomenal property if they are cast
under an illusion? (Frankish 2016, 9-20).
I agree with Frankish’s accusation that the anti-qualia realist
would not be able to tell the difference if a quasi-phenomenal
property is triggering their beliefs about qualia rather than a
phenomenal property. However, that same logic can be used
against illusionism as well, as Frankish himself cannot prove
that quasi-phenomenal properties are causing systematic
illusions about qualia. To that extent, the qualia realist’s
argument that actual qualia are what cause beliefs about qualia
are relatively more parsimonious. In comparison, the illusionist
would have to make concessions to explain why our cognitive
mechanisms cause us to have systematic illusions about nonexistent qualia. Frankish makes no concrete attempt to address
this problem of why we would have systematic illusions about
the nature of our conscious experience.
The Private Language Conflict
In my preceding argument, I showed that Frankish does not
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provide a compelling case that qualia’s constitutive property
of intrinsic subjectivity can be explained as a cognitive illusion.
In order to close the case that Frankish could not in fact pindown intrinsic subjectivity on any other account, I will be reimagining Ludwig Wittgenstein’s infamous “private language”
thought experiment (Wittgenstein 1953, §244-§271). My purpose
in this endeavor is to provide a convincing case that Frankish
cannot simply rely on advancements in neuroscience to provide
a coherent neuroscientific explanation of qualia’s intrinsic
subjectivity as an illusion.
With reference to the “private language” thought experiment,
let us imagine that a neuroscientist enters a room full of
philosophers, each holding a box that cannot be opened. In
order to make some sense of the situation, the philosophers
agree on the assertion, “there is something called a ‘beetle’
inside of my box.” As the neuroscientist is a staunch adherent
to third-person empiricism—over and above all—she believes
that the philosophers cannot prove that there are “beetles”
inside of any of their boxes. After reading Frankish, her gameplan is to discover the complex array of neural correlates that
underpin the philosopher’s “beetle” illusion. Her trusted tool
is the fMRI machine, as hopefully, that will allow her to map
the philosopher’s first-hand reports about “beetles” onto their
brain activity. Assuming she succeeds in finding these neural
correlates, perhaps then the philosophers will concede that their
“beetle” is nothing more than a complex array of neural firings.
Unfortunately for the neuroscientist, her enterprise is precluded
by the philosophers’ definition of what beetles are. As she
attempts to analyze the neural correlates of the philosopher’s
belief propositions, the content of the philosopher’s firsthand reports proclaims that she cannot possibly see what
lies inside the various boxes. Specifically, her problem is that
the philosophers have agreed this concept is “intrinsically
subjective”—analogous to how philosophers conceive of
qualia as exclusively accessible to the subject of experience.
What exactly can the neuroscientist find the neural correlates
of then? The challenge for the neuroscientist is that her only
vehicle of explanation is the fMRI machine, but that does not
equip her with the capacity to make a philosophical argument
that third-person empiricism should be trusted over and above
the philosopher’s claims. If her research program is under
the supervision of Frankish, then her mode of explanation
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is restricted within the bounds of what neural correlates can
explain.
Of course, many philosophers have given strong theoretical
arguments against the beetle-in-the-box dilemma that support
Frankish’s convictions, but they do not rely on specific
neuroscientific evidence whatsoever. Most infamously, the
anti-qualia realist, Daniel Dennett, claims the beetle-inthe-box problem justifies canceling the “language game”
altogether. Specifically, Dennett proclaims that qualia—like
the beetle—has derived its meaning based on how it has been
constructed via philosophical argumentation (Dennett 1998, 4).
His interpretation scathingly undermines qualia’s “intrinsic”
quality because language is inherently relational (i.e., extrinsic).
On this basis, we can eliminate this concept from our ontology
because we have no objective, third-person proof that qualia
exist.
Unlike Dennett, Frankish does not outright dismiss the qualia
realist’s feeling of qualia’s intrinsic subjectivity. He claims that,
despite qualia not being “real,” our intuitions about qualia
substantially reflect how our cognitive mechanisms evaluate
conscious experience (Frankish 2016, 15). When confronting
Chalmer’s meta-problem, Frankish believes that the antiqualia realist must explain why the qualia realist holds the
principle of intrinsic subjectivity from a neurophysiological
perspective. Frankish is determined to confront such qualia
concerns because, quite obviously, Dennett’s dismissal thirty
years prior was unsatisfying for the qualia realists. In fact,
philosophers continually re-imagine thought experiments like
the “beetle-in-the-box” as a justification to push qualia realism
more aggressively. They might consider, “if public language
is extrinsic and relational, then how will I ever determine if
what I refer to as a “beetle” is the same as yours?” According to
qualia realists, questions about intersubjective experience are
important and worth pursuing. Yet if the qualia realist claims
the subject’s privileged access to their own qualia ultimately
bears the truth of the matter, then the neuroscientist is blocked
from offering further insight.
Illusionism & The Meta-Problem
Although I maintain that illusionism fails to address qualia’s
constitutive component of intrinsic subjectivity, there is
an advantage to Frankish’s willingness to accept qualia’s
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constitutive features in his argument. Particularly, when
facing Chalmers’ meta-problem, illusionism seems like the
most agreeable anti-qualia realist position. Unlike Dennett
who dismisses the epistemic reliability of the qualia realists’
claims, illusionism thoughtfully considers the constitutive
features of qualia as described by the qualia realist. Frankish
achieves this common ground by willfully accepting the core
arguments like Chalmer’s metaphysical intuition. Returning
to my mirage analogy, Frankish does not simply tell the
person standing in the desert: “you do not actually see a lake
in front of you because your experience does not exist as
such.” Instead, Frankish argues that there ought to be a robust,
causal explanation that does justice to the verisimilitude of the
subject’s conscious experience of the mirage.
Since Frankish conveys a non-dismissive attitude towards
qualia realism beliefs (e.g., qualia are irreducible), Chalmers
says that he would identify as an illusionist if he was forced
to pick another position (Chalmers 2018, 8). Appealing to
qualia realists is integral because, quite obviously, they are the
ones who need convincing. To be clear, I am not implying that
Chalmers is the righteous authority who gets to make the final
call about which solution to the meta-problem is ultimately
“right.” Rather, I am identifying a key explanatory advantage of
illusionism in its ability to advance the discussion by agreeing
with the qualia realist’s definition. In this sense, Frankish could
refute my argument by claiming that it is unsatisfactory for
anti-qualia realists to dismiss the qualia realist’s reports about
what their conscious experience feels like at face value. Frankish
voices this motivation in his response to his fellow anti-qualia
realists (e.g., Nicholas Humphrey, Peter Mandik)—as he
argues that anti-qualia realists present an “inclusive attitude”
towards the qualia realist’s claims about the nature of conscious
experience (Frankish 2016, 16).
In response, I argue that Frankish’s “inclusive attitude” is also
his greatest shortcoming, as he is unable to explain how his
methodology can penetrate the concept of intrinsic subjectivity.
Frankish’s whole theory of illusionism is based on the premise
that neuroscience may eventually explain our beliefs about
conscious experience (Frankish 2016, 16). Since Frankish does
not have a neuroscientific explanation for why qualia realists
believe that qualia are intrinsically subjective, he must rely on
his intuition that qualia are not causing these beliefs. To that
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extent, his response is equally as unscientific and unfounded
in third-person empirical evidence as the qualia realist position
that he criticizes. In other words, Frankish’s own perspective
on qualia-as-intrinsic is not substantiated by the neuroscientific
explanations which he holds as the golden standard for theories
of consciousness.
Conclusion
In summary, I argue that Frankish’s theory of illusionism is illequipped for dismantling intrinsic subjectivity as a constitutive
component of qualia. First, I explained the history of the qualia
realism debate and why Frankish is compelled to confront
Chalmer’s metaphysical intuition that qualia are intrinsically
subjective. I argued that Frankish’s illusionist methodology fails
to properly address qualia’s component of intrinsic subjectivity
in two different contexts: Goff’s theory of panpsychism, a
theory of consciousness that holds intrinsic subjectivity as a
core feature, and my re-imagining of Wittgenstein’s “private
language” thought experiment.
Ultimately, Frankish’s fatal error is his willingness to accept
whatever qualia intuitions are thrown upon him and to merely
rely on advancements in neuroscience to address them. The
tragic fate for anti-qualia realism is that advancements in
neuroscience may eventually provide substantive explanations
for every other constitutive feature of qualia (e.g., ineffability,
irreducibility). Nevertheless, the illusionist’s explanation for
intrinsic subjectivity will always seem like it is missing the
point of what “intrinsic subjectivity” truly means.

33

Illusionment on the Brink of Disillusionment

Bibliography
Chalmers, David J. “How Can We Construct a Science of
Consciousness?” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,
vol. 1303, no. 1, 2013, pp. 25–35., doi:10.1111/nyas.12166.
Chalmers, David. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.”
Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 3, 1995, doi:10.7551/
mitpress/6860.003.0003.
Chalmers, David. “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.”
Journal of Consciousness Studies , no. 25, 2018.
Dennett, Daniel C. “Quining Qualia.” Consciousness in
Contemporary Science, 1988, pp. 42–77., doi:10.1093/
acprof:oso/9780198522379.003.0003.
Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy. Simon &
Brown, 1641.
Frankish, Keith. “Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness.”
Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 23, 2016, pp. 11–12.
Frankish, Keith. “Not Disillusioned: Reply to Commentators.”
Journal of Consciousness , 23 , no. 11, ser. 12, 2016, pp. 256–289.
12.
Goff, Philip. Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of
Consciousness. Vintage Books, 2020.
Goff, Philip. “Real Acquaintance and Physicalism.”
Phenomenal Qualities, 2015, pp. 121–143., doi:10.1093/
acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0005.
Langton, Rae, and David Lewis. “Defining
‘Intrinsic.’” Companion to Intrinsic Properties, 1998,
doi:10.1515/9783110292596.17.
Lavazza, Andrea, and Howard Robinson. Contemporary
Dualism: A Defense. Routledge, 2014.
Lewis, Clarence Irving. Mind and the World-Order: Outline of a
Theory of Knowledge. Kessinger Publishing, 1929.
34

EPISTEME XXXIII

Lewis, David. “Extrinsic Properties.” Philosophical Studies, vol.
44, no. 2, 1983, pp. 197–200., doi:10.1007/bf00354100.
Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical
Review, vol. 83, no. 4, 1974, p. 435., doi:10.2307/2183914.
Russell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Matter. 1927.
Siddharth, S., and Sangeetha Menon. “What Does It Mean for
Qualia to Be Intrinsic?” Self, Culture and Consciousness, 2017,
pp. 403–417., doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_23.
Sprevak, Mark, and Elizabeth Irvine. “Eliminativism
about Consciousness.” Oxford Handbook of the
Philosophy of Consciousness, 2020, doi:10.1093/
oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.16.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell,
1953.

35

